Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2008

Bruce Hills and Judith Hills, Mard D. Hills v. United
Parcel Service Inc., UPSCO United Parcel Service
Co., Liberty Mutual Holding Company Inc.,
Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Skyline
Electric Company : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael E. Dyer, Kira M. Slawson; Blackburn and Stoll, PC; Taggart Hansen; Gibson, Dunn and
Crutcher LLP; Attorneys for Appellee.
Edward P. Moriarity, Bradley L. Booke; Moriarity, Badaruddin & Booke, LLC; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Hills v. United Parcel Service, No. 20080826 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1202

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

APPELATE CASE
NO. 20080826

BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS
Individually, and as natural parents
and heirs of MARK D. HILLS,

Plaintiff/Appeiiants,

vs.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE., INC., an Ohio Corporation; UPSCO UNITED PARCEL
SERVICE CO., a Delaware Corporation; UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., a Utah
Corporation; LIBERTY MUTUAL HOLDING COMPANY, INC., a Massachusetts
Mutual Holding Company; LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a
Massachusetts Mutual Holding Company; and SKYLINE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendant/Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
HONORABLE TERRY L. CHRISTIANSEN

MICHAEL E. DYER
KIRAM.SLAWSON
BLACKBURN & STOLL, PC
257 East 200 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
TAGGART HANSEN (pro hoc vice)
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHERLLP
1801 Califomia Street, Suite 4200
Denver, CO 80202
Attorneys for Appellee UPS Inc, et aL

EDWARD P. MORIARITY (Bar No. 5622)
BRADLEY L. BOOKE (Bar No. 9984)
MORIARITY, BADARUDDIN
& BOOKE, LLC
8 East Broadway, Suite 312
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: 801326 8090
Facsimile:
801 521 0546

Attorneys for Appellants

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAY 1 9 2009

DENNIS R. JAMES
SARA N.BECKER
MORGAN, MINNOCK, RICE & JAMES LC
136 South Main, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Appellee Skyline Electric Company
GARY L. JOHNSON
MARTHA KNUDSON
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Wells Fargo Center
299 South Main, 15* Floor
PO Box 2465
Salt lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Appellee Liberty Mutual Holding Company Inc., et aL

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

APPELATE CASE
NO. 20080826

BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS
Individually, and as natural parents
and heirs of MARK D. HELLS,

PlaintifiTAppellants,

vs.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE., INC., an Ohio Corporation; UPSCO UNITED PARCEL
SERVICE CO., a Delaware Corporation; UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., a Utah
Corporation; LIBERTY MUTUAL HOLDING COMPANY, INC., a Massachusetts
Mutual Holding Company; LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a
Massachusetts Mutual Holding Company; and SKYLINE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendant/Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
HONORABLE TERRY L. CHRISTIANSEN

MICHAEL E. DYER
KIRA M. SLAWSON
BLACKBURN &STOLL, PC
257 East 200 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, m 84111
TAGGART HANSEN (pro hoc vice)
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHERLLP
1801 California Street, Suite 4200
Denver, CO 80202
Attorneys for Appellee UPS IIHX, et al

EDWARD P. MORIAR1TY (Bar No. 5622)
BRADLEY L. BOOKE (Bar No. 9984)
MORIARITY, BADARUDDIN
& BOOKE, LLC
8 East Broadway, Suite 312
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: 801326 8090
Facsimile:
801 521 0546

Attorneys for Appellants

DENNIS R. JAMES
SARA N.BECKER
MORGAN, MJNNOCK, RICE & JAMES LC
136 South Main, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Appellee Skyline Electric Company
GARY L. JOHNSON
MARTHA KNUDSON
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Wells Fargo Center
299 South Main, 15th Floor
PO Box 2465
Salt lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Appellee Liberty Mutual Holding Company Inc^ et aL

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

I.

ARGUMENT

1

A.

UTAH SHOULD RECOGNIZE SPOLIATION

1

B.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE PLED SPOLIATION

5

C.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE BEEN DAMAGED

6

D.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION BAR IS INAPPLICABLE TO UPS

8

1.

THE DUAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE APPLIES

9

3.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE PLED INTENTIONAL ACTS BY DEFENDANT UPS

11

X

SPOLIATION DAMAGES ARE OUTSIDE THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION
FORMULA

E.

II.

13

PLAINTIFFS HAVE PLED AND MET THE ELEMENTS OF
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE

14

F.

INTERFERENCE WITH CAUSE OF ACTION CONSTITUTES SPOLIATION

16

G.

PuNrnvE DAMAGES APPLY IF SPOLIATION IS RECOGNIZED

17

CONCLUSION

19

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Allen v. U.S., 588 F.Supp. 247 (1984)

7

Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d 678 (Utah 1985)

9,10

Carter v. Exide Corporation, 661 So.2d 698 (La.App. 2 Cir.,1995)

13

Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. App.3d 1273,
286 CaLRptr. 855 (1991)

9

Coleman v. Eddy Potash, 905 P.2d 185 (NM.,1985)

2, 14

Glotzbachv. Froman, 854N.E.2d337 (Ind.2006)

7

Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 824 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 2005)

8

Guillory v. Dillard's Dept. Store, Inc., Ill So.2d 1 (App. LA,2000)

16

Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Industrial Commission, 275 P. 777 (1929)

10

Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560 (W.Va.,2003)

1, 2, 5

Helfv. Chevron U.SA., Inc., 203 P.3d 962 (Utah 2009)
Hills v. Skyline Electric Co., Civil No. 040107125,
Third Judicial District Court (R. 613 - 718)

12

4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12

Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846 (D.C.,1998)
Landgrafv.USIFilm Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994)
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293
(Utah 1982)
Lincoln Insurance Company v. Home Emergency Services, Inc., 812 So.2d 433.
(Fl. Ct. App.,2002)
Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11 (Mont, 1999)

ii

1, 5
18

14,15
13
2,14

Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 2000 UT 94, f 19, 16 P.3d 555
Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Oh.,1993)

13
5, 6

State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991)
Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244 (1980)
Thompson v. Owensby, 704N.E.2d 134 (In.Ct.App., 1998)

17
14, 15
7
7, 8

Useiyv. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976)
Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 416 (1996)

18
16,17

Wilson v. Colonial Penn Life Ins., ASA F.Supp. 1208

16

Worthen v. Kennecott Corporation, 780 F.2d 856 (10th Cir.,1985)

10

Statutes
Utah Administrative Code, R614-1-5.C.2

4, 9,19

Workers' Compensation Act,
Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-105Q) (1999)
Utah Code Annotated §34A-6-l 10

13
3

Utah Code Ann., § 76-2-204

3

Utah Code Ann., § 76-8-510.5

3

iii

L

ARGUMENT
A. UTAH SHOULD RECOGNIZE SPOLIATION.

Defendant/Appellees, United Parcel Service and Liberty Mutual, argue
that Utah should not adopt spoliation as an independent cause of action.
Defendants primarily rely upon the assertion that evidentiary inferences,
sanctions for misconduct, or criminal penalties - or in the instant case
administrative code, specifically the Utah OSH Act, work as effective
deterrents against evidence tampering or destruction. See Defendant UPS Br.
12, 21-23; Defendant Liberty Mutual Br. at 17-18. But, the reality is, none
of these mechanisms were effective at stopping Defendants from spoiling
evidence and Plaintiffs were consequently damaged.
Courts adopting spoliation have reasoned that general principles of
law necessitate recognition. "The concept of American justice...pronounces
that for every wrong there is a remedy. It is incompatible with this concept
to deprive a wrongfully injured party of a remedy," Hannah v. Heeter, 584
S.E.2d 560, 566 (W.Va.,2003), and "New torts are recognized when an
interest requiring protection from unreasonable interference is identified.
The common thread woven into all torts is the idea of unreasonable
interference with the interests of others." Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car,
710 A.2d 846, 848 (D.C.,1998)(internal citations omitted).

1

Specific to the wrong inherent in evidence destruction, Montana has
reasoned, "[t]he intentional or negligent destruction or spoliation of evidence
cannot be condoned and threatens the very integrity of the judicial system."
Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 17 (Mont., 1999). New Mexico
concludes, "[w]e base our recognition of this tort on our be I id (hat the
intentional destruction of potential evidence in order to disrupt or defeat
another person's right of recovery is highly improper and cannot be
justified." Coleman v. Eddy Potash, 905 P.2d 185, 189 (NM.,1985).
Beyond these general and specific reasons to adopt spoliation, courts
have identified that plaintiffs lack recourse for damages against third-party
spoliators; therefore the tort of spoliation serves a critical legal function.
"When evidence is in the possession of a third party, however, the various
sanctions available to the trial judge are inapplicable and other
considerations arise."

Oliver, 993 P.2d at 17.

West Virginia reasons

similarly, "a third party spoliator is not subject to an adverse inference
instruction or discovery sanctions. Thus, when a third party destroys
evidence, the party who is injured by the spoliation does not have the benefit
of existing remedies. Such a result conflicts with our policy of providing a
remedy for every wrong and compensating victims of tortious conduct."
Hannah, 560 S.E.2d at 568.

2

In the instant case, as originally pled by Plaintiffs, Defendants UPS
and Liberty Mutual willfully and intentionally removed and altered evidence
of Mark Hills' death, Compl. Tflj 50-51 (R. 12); engaged in such to prevent
and hinder potential litigation against the appellees, Compl. fflf 53-54 (R.
12); and Plaintiffs' legal cause of action was consequently damaged.
Compl. 1| 69G-k) (R. 21-22).
UPS trivializes what happened as "in the interest of worker safety"
and omits the chronological fact that the Utah Occupational and Safety
Health Division of the Labor Commission (UOSH) had instructed UPS and
Liberty Mutual to not alter the scene the morning of the accident (UPS Br. 56; R. at 915, ^f 7) and furthermore UPS had already altered the scene before
UOSH arrived, contrary to law (R. at 915, 917;fflf6, 15).1 Yet, despite the
potential UOSH sanctions and potential criminal charges pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-510.5 and § 76-2-204, Defendants still engaged in
destruction of evidence.

The established deterrents failed to thwart

Defendants malfeasant behavior.

1

Irrespective of these UOSH violations, as U.C.A. 34A-6-110 prohibits use
of OSHA provisions to affect common law duties, Plaintiffs pled a general
duty to preserve the scene and evidence as well as a general violation of
applicable law. Compl. Iffl 62-65 (R.14); Iffl 73-78 (R. 16-17); and ffij 86-91
(R. 19-20).
3

More importantly, though, Plaintiffs cannot seek recourse for their
damages, as further discussed below, incurred as a consequence of the thirdparty Defendants' acts in the first-party lawsuit Plaintiffs filed against
Skyline Electric Company. See, Hills v. Skyline Electric Co., Civil No.
040107125, Third Judicial District Court (hereinafter "Hills I").(R. 613 718).
As an alternative to the proposition that current legal or administrative
mechanisms are adequate to address spoliation, UPS argues the burden upon
the employer would be too great to preserve evidence in the event of thirdparty litigation. UPS Br. 26. This contention lacks merit. Employers are
already required by UOSH, pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R614-15.C.2, to preserve evidence relative to an accident scene until authorized by
UOSH to remove or destroy such evidence. In light of this UPS's claim the
independent tort of spoliation would further burden an employer than
already required by administrative code is groundless. Preserved for the
record and a potential civil suit, due to an employer's adherence to UOSH
requirements and the ensuing UUSH accident investigation, would be
evidence of the cause of the accident - unless, as in the instant case, the
employer intentionally destroys such evidence.

4

Taking into account the lack of burden upon an employer; the need for
legal recourse against a third-party spoliator; and the inadequacy of
deterrents poised by Utah's administrative code or criminal sanctions, this
Court should adopt spoliation as a legal remedy. Doing so is congruent with
judicial axioms expressed in Hannah that for every wrong there is a remedy
and Holmes that a party's interests should be protected from unreasonable
interference.

The destruction of evidence by a third-party without an

available recourse for an injured first-party plaintiff runs contrary to justice.
Such malfeasance if unaddressed, "threatens the very integrity of the judicial
system."
B. PLAINTIFFS HAVE PLED THE ELEMENTS OF SPOLIAHON.

UPS and Liberty Mutual contend Plaintiffs have failed to meet the elements of
spoliation. UPS Br. 13-19; Liberty Mutual Br. 18-22. As argued in Plaintifis brief;
this Court should adopt the elements of spoliation set forth in Smith v. Howard
Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Oh.,1993): "(I) pending or probable
litigation involving the plaintiff, (2) knowledge on the part of defendant that
litigation exists or is probable, (3).willful destruction of evidence by
defendant designed to disrupt the plaintiffs case, (4) disruption of the
plaintiffs case, and (5) damages proximately caused by the defendant's
acts." Smith 615 N.E.2d at 1038. These five elements, in particular the fifth

5

element, can be demonstrated by Plaintiffs as these Ohio factors do not
require the inability to prove the underlying suit.
Under the Smith elements, as previously argued in Plaintiffs' Brief,
(1) Mark Hills' wrongful death, made litigation involving Plaintiffs
probable; (2) the gravity of the event and Defendants' related evasive
behavior and onsite attendance by counsel, indicates knowledge of probable
litigation;

(3) the willful alteration and destruction of evidence by

Defendants was designed to disrupt an investigation, and thereby impede
Plaintiffs' probable suit; (4) these actions disrupted Plaintiffs' case by
forcing litigation with the non-parties UPS and Liberty Mutual in Hills I to
obtain destroyed and altered causation evidence; and (5) Defendants' actions
proximately caused damage to Plaintiffs as further discussed below.
C. PIAESTIFFSHAVE BEEN DAMAGED.

UPS and Liberty Mutual argue Plaintiffs have not been damaged, as
Skyline Electric has admitted liability in the underlying Hills I lawsuit. UPS
Br. 15; Liberty Mutual Br. 18-19. To the contrary, though, Appellants have
been damaged by incurring the additional expense of litigating with nonparties UPS to compel discovery in Hills I of the UOSH accident report
[UPS restricted UOSH from releasing the report. (R. 825 - 827)]; and the
expense and time of litigating with UPS to compel Heath Engineering's

6

reports and Heath Engineering personnel responsible for evidence alteration
and destruction. (R. 913 - 927).

These expenses increased the cost of

litigating Hills I thereby reducing Plaintiffs net recovery and probable
expectancy.

As originally pled in the Complaint, and pertinent to these

expenses, Plaintiffs sustained damages from tortious interference with a
legal cause of action and hindrance with a lawful cause of action. Compl. f
69(j-k) (R. 21-22). Without UPS and Liberty Mutuals' alteration and
destruction of evidence, the forgoing legal proceedings would have been
unnecessary.
UPS counters that such damages cannot be assessed in a spoliation
action, attacking Plaintiffs' citation to Thompson v. Owensby, 704 N.E.2d
134 (In.Ct.App., 1998). UPS Br. 18.3 In Thompson, the Indiana Court of

2

The district court states that Plaintiffs' damages for wrongful death were
fixed at the moment of Mark Hills' death, Dist. Ct. Op. at 5-6 n2 (R. 122829 n.2). UPS and Liberty Mutual rely upon this assessment in their briefs.
UPS Br. 15-16; Liberty Mutual Br. 28. Although the elements that compose
a wrongful death cause of action in Utah [loss of support; loss of assistance
and service to the family; loss of society, companionship and happiness of
associations, and loss of the possibility of inheritance, if decedent is an adult,
Allen v. U.S., 588 F.Supp. 247, 445 (1984)], would be fixed at time of death,
and these damages constitute a property right for the heirs, Switzer v.
Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244, 247(1980), the net recovery from these injuries can
be reduced and altered by a defendant's spoliation acts.
UPS improperly claims that Thompson has been rejected by the Indiana
Supreme Court. To support this UPS makes an in incomprehensible cite to
"supra at 21 n.3." UPS Br. 18. Instead, Thompson has been distinguished by
the Indiana Supreme Court in Glotzbach v. Froman, 854 N.E.2d 337
7

Appeals noted, besides alleging damages resulting from inability to prove
the underlying suit, alternatively an injured party can assert damages due to
the cost of conducting additional discovery needed to provide alternative
proof due to the destroyed evidence.

Thompson, 704 N.E.2d at FN 7.

Plaintiffs, during the discovery process in Hills /, as argued above, incurred
additional legal costs in order to discern causation as a result of the
spoliation conducted by Defendants.
UPS also relies upon the district court's reasoning that the damages
Plaintiffs seek merely constitute delay, and as such do not qualify as
compensable damages. UPS Br. 16-18. First, contrary to the district court's
argument, motions to compel occurred in Hills /, as stated above. Second,
these motions constituted additional discovery - the cost of which Thompson
notes is an appropriate measure of damages, in the alternative to inability to
prove an underlying first party suit.
D. WORKERS' COMPENSATION BAR IS INAPPUCABLE TO UPS

UPS incorrectly reasons that its acts of spoliation are barred by the
exclusivity provision of Utah's Worker's Compensation Act. This argument
dispels the applicability of the dual capacity doctrine; the willful and

(Ind.2006) and Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 824 N.E.2d 349 (Ind.
2005).
8

intentional nature of UPS's spoliation; as well as the fact spoliation damages
are considered outside the coverage formula of workers' compensation acts.
1) THE DUAL CAPAOTY DOCTRINE APPLIES

The application of the dual capacity doctrine depends upon "whether
the employer's conduct in the second role or capacity has generated
obligations that are unrelated to those flowing from the company's ... first
role as an employer." Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah
1985)(emphasis added). UPS cites the fact that Utah's OSH Act mandates
employers to preserve post-accident evidence; therefore, UPS's obligation to
preserve evidence stems from their role as Mark Hills' employer pursuant to
Utah Admin. Code R614-1-5.C.2.

UPS Br. 30-32.

Irrespective of the

UOSH code, though, Plaintiffs pled a general duty to preserve evidence
[Compl. m 62-65 (R.14); fflf 75-78 (R. 16-17); ffif 88-91 (R. 19-20)] and
Plaintiffs' Brief does not rely upon UOSH codes to impart a duty to UPS to
preserve evidence.
As argued (PL Br. 28-31), an obligation arose that was unrelated to
UPS's role as Mark Hills' employer. Consistent with Coca Cola Bottling
Co. v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. App.3d 1273, 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 (1991),
UPS had a second capacity as an evidentiary caretaker which arose after the
claimant's on the job related injury. Coca Cola at 1293, 867. Whether or

9

not this role relates to UPS's first role as Mark Hills' employer, given Utah
precedent in Bingham, hinges upon what constitutes "flowing from." The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which interpreted Utah's potential
application of the dual capacity doctrine as set forth in Bingham, opined
"flowing from" is analogous to "attributable to the accident resulting in
injury which as a primary cause set in motion a train of events from which
the aggravated condition resulted," Worthen v. Kennecott Corporation, 780
F.2d 856, 859 FN2 (10th Cir.,1985), citing Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 215 P. 777, 779 (1929). In the instant case, UPS's intentional
destruction of evidence resulted in damages that were wholly unrelated to
injury that caused the fatal electrocution of Mark Hills. The former are
damages to probable expectancy which do not flow from the bodily
electrocution of Mr. Hills.

Instead, UPS committed a separate act that

harmed a property right of Mr. Hills, whereas Skyline Electric's negligence
caused the actual on-the-job injury.
In addition, while examining Utah's potential application of the dual
capacity doctrine, the Worthen court also explained that Utah's OSH Act
covers a "broad range of foreseeable events set in motion by the on-the-job
injury." Worthen, 780 F.2d at 859 (emphasis added). Intentional destruction

10

of post-accident evidence by an employer does not constituent a foreseeable
event as a result of Mark Hills employment.
2. PL\i>mora^
UPS

To buttress the argument that Utah's workers' compensation
exclusivity bar applies, and the intentional acts preclusion is inapplicable,
UPS asserts Plaintiffs have only pled Skyline Electric caused harm to
decedent Mark Hills. Meanwhile, UPS claims Plaintiffs failed to plead
intentional or harmful behavior by UPS. UPS Br. 33. UPS further alleges
that Plaintiffs never alleged UPS spoiled evidence to cover up its own
culpability. Id. These allegations suggest that UPS confuses the underlying
negligence tort in Hills /, an electrocution death, with the separate tort of
spoliation asserted in the present action.
To begin, Plaintiffs' complaint states, "defendants willfully and
intentionally...removed and/or altered equipment, materials or other
evidence pertaining to the cause of the electrocution." Compl. ^f 35 (R. 8).
Plaintiffs also alleged defendants performed such acts to "cover up the true
facts and circumstances" of Mark Hills' death and "prevent Plaintiffs from
bringing an action against defendants." Compl. Tflj 53-54 (R. 12). Finally,
Plaintiffs pled damages resulting from this intentional interference and
hindrance with their legal cause of action. Compl. Iff 96 G-k)(R. 21-22).
II

In addition to Plaintiffs having pled the assertions UPS claims were
not made, the issue is not culpability of UPS for the fatal electrocution. The
issue is whether UPS's post-accident evidence destruction and alteration
harmed Plaintiffs. The Hills I lawsuit pertains to an electrocution tort which
UPS has nothing to do with, whereas the instant action revolves around
evidence destruction.

Furthermore, the inquiry is not about motive and

whether UPS was hiding its culpability. Motive is not a requisite element in
the intentional acts exception to the workers' compensation exclusivity bar.
"Rather than defining and determining intent, the "intent to injure" analysis
focuses on whether the actor knew or expected that injury would occur as a
consequence of his actions, thereby distinguishing between intentional and
unintentional workplace injuries under the Act." Helfv. Chevron U.SA., Inc.,
203 P.3d 962, 970 (Utah 2009). Thus, the inquiry is whether UPS knew or
expected that the injury - the destruction and alteration of accident scene
evidence - would result in damage to a potential lawsuit by Mark Hills'
heirs against the liable party. Clearly altering or destroying evidence at an
accident scene would impede and harm the ability to prove what caused the
accident and who is at fault.

12

3. SPOLIATION DAMAGES ARE OUTSIDE WORKERS' COMPENSATION
FORMULA.

UPS fails to address Plaintiffs' argument that spoliation damages are
considered outside the "coverage formula" of workers' compensation
exclusivity provisions. PL Br. 20-23; 25; see also Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2105(1) (1999). This argument alone precludes the need to discuss the
applicability of the dual capacity doctrine or whether Defendant UPS's
behavior was willful and intentional. Spoliation damages preclusion from
the workers' compensation formula also undermines UPS's claim that this
Court must adopt two new theories, spoliation and the dual capacity
doctrine, in order for Plaintiffs to prevail. UPS Br. 12.
UPS is wrong because: (1) Utah has recognized that non-physical and
non-mental injuries are not within the exclusivity provision of workers'
compensation, as stated in Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 2000 UT 94, f
19, 16 P.3d 555, and (2) jurisdictions acknowledging third-party employeremployee spoliation delineate the damage a non-bodily injury outside the
scope of workers' compensation coverage. Consequently, UPS's acts should
not be barred pursuant to Utah's Workers' Compensation Act.4

4

Jurisdictions holding spoliation damages as outside workers' compensation
formula/exclusivity: Florida, Lincoln Insurance Company v. Home
Emergency Services, Inc., 812 So.2d 433, 436 (Fl. Ct. App.,2002);
Louisiana, Carter v. Exide Corporation, 661 So.2d 698, 704 (La.App. 2
13

E. PIAINTIFFSHAVE PLED AND MET THE ELEMENTS OF INTENTIONAL
INTERFERENCE

Liberty Mutual asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to meet the elements
of the underlying and recognized Utah tort of intentional interference
(Liberty Mutual Br. 26-30), a tort which serves as a foundation for courts
that adopt spoliation. Liberty Mutual attacks Plaintiffs' theory based upon
the second and third prong of the intentional interference test put forth in
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isomer, 657 P.2d 293(Utah 1982).
Respectively, these are: (2) the tortfeasor must act with an improper purpose
and (3) consequently damage the plaintiff. Leigh, 657 P.2d at 304.
Liberty Mutual premises the lack of improper purpose upon the fact
there was a legitimate reason to alter or destroy accident scene evidence,
citing St Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah
1991). Specifically, Liberty Mutual states Defendants needed to determine
the cause of the accident and prevent injury to others. Liberty Mutual Br.
29. But, the reality is Defendants, despite being told to seal and isolate the
Mobile Distribution Unit (MDA), wherein the electrocution had occurred
(the sealing and isolation of which would have been the safest precaution),
instead reconnected the MDA to the distribution facility and had third-party

Cir.,1995); Montana, Oliver, 993 P.2d 11 at 16-17; and New Mexico,
Coleman, 905 P.2d at 192.
14

Heath Engineering alter accident evidence.

(R. 915-916). Furthermore,

prior to UOSH's arrival on the morning of the accident, Defendants had
already altered or destroyed evidence pertaining to the accident instead of
taking the sensible safety precaution of restricting people from the accident
scene and preserving the scene's integrity. (R. 914-916).
In contrast, in St. Benedict's Hospital, upon which Liberty Mutual
relies, the defendant hospital's damaging acts were deemed "an inevitable
byproduct of competition." The defendant hospital had merely solicited
tenants for a new office building - tenants who might have remained tenants
of the plaintiffs. The court held such conduct by the hospital, engaged in
during the regular course of business, did not qualify as improper, supra at
201, citing Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 307. Dissimilarly, in the instant
case, it can hardly be argued that the evidence destruction and alteration by
the Defendants was an inevitable result of worker safety or accident
investigation. Worker safety could have been best addressed by isolating the
hazardous accident site from employees and Defendants' investigation easily
conducted in accord with UOSH requirements. But, instead as alleged in
Plaintiffs' complaint, Defendants engaged in evidence destruction and
alteration to improperly prevent or hinder Plaintiffs' potential legal cause of
action. Compl.fflf53-54 (R. 12).

15

Liberty Mutual also asserts that Plaintiffs have not been able to
demonstrate the third prong of intentional interference, damages. Liberty
Mutual Br. 28. Plaintiffs, as previously argued in Section C above, have
been damaged.
F. INTERFERENCE WITH CAUSE OF ACTION CONSTITUTES SPOLIATION

Liberty Mutual contends that "interference with a legal process" is not
a recognized action, citing Wilson v. Colonial Penn Life Ins., 454 F.Supp.
1208. Liberty Mutual Br. 33. It can be assumed Liberty Mutual does so to
refute Plaintiffs' original pleading of tortious interference with a legal cause
of action. Compl. Tf 69(j-k) (R. 21-22). This issue, though, is a matter of
semantics. As noted in Guilloiy v. Dillard's Dept. Store, Inc., Ill So.2d 1
(App. LA,2000), "[i]n some cases, when a plaintiff claims that the ability to
institute or prove a civil claim has been impaired due to the negligent or
intentional spoliation of evidence by another, courts have addressed the
causes of action for impairment of a civil claim and spoliation of evidence as
one. Thus, we believe that it is of little importance here, to determine an
exact title to label plaintiffs claim." Id. at 4.
Liberty Mutual also references the Idaho Supreme Court in Yoakum v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 416 (1996) to indicate that "unreasonable
interference" is necessary to demonstrate interference with a prospective
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civil action - and presumably that Plaintiffs have not established such.
Liberty Mutual Br. 34-35. In Yoakum, though, the defendant insurer had
merely hired an accident investigator whose original evaluation of a golf cart
involved in an accident found the cart defective. During this investigator's
second evaluation of the cart - while in the employ of the defendant insurer
- he found no defect in the cart. The court reasoned the insurer's retention
of the expert was merely meant to "minimize [the insured's] liability, and
therefore its own exposure to substantial damages therefrom, by hiring [the
expert] to reinvestigate the vehicle and the accident. That is clearly not an
improper motive." Id. at 424.

In the instant case, Defendants' Liberty

Mutual and UPS's acts did not constitute mere reinvestigation of the
accident scene. Right after the accident as well as after an initial visit by
UOSH's Compliance Officer defendants altered, removed, or destroyed
evidence of the cause of the electrocution.
Plaintiffs'

likely

wrongful

death

These deliberate acts, given

lawsuit,

constitute

unreasonable

interference - or "tortious interference" as pled by Plaintiffs.
G. PUNITIVE DAMAGES APPLY IF SPOLIATION IS RECOGNIZED

UPS cites due process considerations to refute the application of
punitive damages as a deterrent against spoliation. UPS Br. 34-35. Yet, the
first case UPS relies upon, State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
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U.S. 408 (2003), is a US Supreme Court decision that adjudicates whether
the excessive size of a punitive damage claim satisfies due process criteria5 - not
if the imposition of punitive damages in a previously unrecognized tort violates due
process.
UPS also relies upon Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) to
assert violation of due process. The Landgraf opinion proves a poor analogy. The
Landgrqf court, after a lengthy analysis of what should be considered if a statute
retroactively applies punitive damages, held this question inapplicable as the statute at
issue did not explicitly apply retroactive punitive damages. More importantly,
although Landgraf s dicta indicates there is a presumption against statutory
retroactivity, it is not a per se violation of due process to apply duties or damages
retroactively. In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), the US
Supreme Court reasoned, "our cases are clear that legislation readjusting rights and
burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations. This is
true even though the effect of the legislation is to impose a new duty or liability based
on past acts," supra at 17 (internal citations omitted).
In Usery, unlike Landgraf which UPS relies upon, the law in question
explicitly imposed retrospective liability. Therefore, the US Supreme Court took a
further two step analysis to decide if due process was violated First, the possibility
5

Held that $145 million in punitive damages award on $1 million compensatory
judgment violated due process.
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that the tortfeasor did not know harm would be caused by his actions must be
considered Second, it must be asked, even if the tortfeasor knew harm was eminent
did he behave in reliance upon the current state of the law? Id In the case subjudice,
it is implicit that UPS and Liberty Mutual would know destruction or alteration of an
accident scene would affect potential causation evidence in a third-party lawsuit thereby harming plaintiffs. And, most certainly, UPS and Liberty Mutual did not rely
upon any law allowing them to destroy or alter accident scene evidence. To the
contrary, Defendants violated Utah Admin. Code, R614-1-5.C.2.
Meanwhile, Liberty Mutual argues punitive damages are inapplicable as
Plaintiffs' have not effectively pled intentional acts or proved an underlying viable
cause of action. These issues, as previously argued above and in Plaintiffs' Brief,
remain to be decided by this Court.
EL

CONCLUSION
The district court erred when it granted Defendant UPS's Motion to Dismiss,

with prejudice, as Plaintiffs' allegations were sufficiently pled to constitute spoliation
- a cause of action that should be recognized in Utah; Plaintiffs' allegations were
sufficiently pled to invoke the dual capacity doctrine; and Plaintiffs' allegations were
sufficiently pled to fall within the "intentional acf exception to Utah's Workers
Compensation Act Moreover, Liberty Mutual should have not been dismissed with
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prejudice, as none of the Workers' Compensation Act exclusivity provisions apply to
Liberty Mutual, given Liberty Mutual did not employ decedent Mark Hills.

Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD?. MORIARTTY (Bar NO. 5882)
Bradley L Booke (Bar No. 9984)
Attorneys for Appellants
MORIARTTY, BADARUDDIN & BOOKE
8 East Broadway Street, Suite 312
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
TELEPHONE: 801-326-8090
FACSIMILE:801 521-0546

20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 19 day of May 2009, pursuant to
Utah.RApp.P. 26(b), I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing
document, along with a CD containing a searchable pdf of the document, to
be served on each separately represented party or Appellee, by depositing
copies in the United States mail, proper first class postage affixed, and
addressed to the following:
DENNIS R. JAMES
SARA N. BECKER
MORGAN, MINNOCK, RICE & JAMES
136 South Main, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

MICHAEL E. DYER
KIRA M. SLAWSON
BLACKBURN & STOLL
257 East 200 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84lll

Attorneysfor Appellee Skyline Electric Company

Attorneysfor Appellee UPS Inc., etal.

GARY L. JOHNSON
MARTHA KNUDSON
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
229 Soulh Main, 15* Floor
PO Box 2465
SaltLakeCity,UT84111

TAGGART HANSEN (pro hoc vice)
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER
1801 California Street, # 4200
Denver, CO 80202
Attorney for Appellee UPS Inc., etal.

Attorneysfor Appellee Liberty Mutual
Holding Company, Inc., et al.
Further, I provided to the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court, via
hand delivery, an original and 9 copies of the foregoing brief along with a CD
containing a searchable pdf version of the document.

V—

An Employee of Moriarity, Badaruddin & Booke
21

